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Abstract 
One of the most important legacies of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and the ensuing twenty years 
post peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse 
Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organised 
criminal and cross-border activities. And yet, little scholarship has been dedicated to examining the 
nexus between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland or to accurately understanding the 
role that paramilitaries play in organised crime and their dynamic interactions with organised criminal 
groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in 
Northern Ireland, it is this increasingly important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does 
so by developing a new terrorism-organised crime interaction theoretical model designed specifically 
for application to Northern Ireland in order to shed new light on the evolution and current complex 
linkages between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland and beyond.  
The Northern Ireland model, which both builds on and departs from crime-terror models in existing 
scholarship, reveals a vast array of domestic and transnational ‘activity assimilation’ and ‘alliances’, as 
well as other forms of interactions including ‘conflicts’ and different gradations of ‘transformation’. 
The article concludes that national terrorism-organised crime models, and the Northern Ireland model 
in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are 
most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across 
diverse environments rather than existing models that are abstract and designed for universal 
application. Northern Ireland presently faces a serious threat to its security and stability posed by the 
nexus between terrorism and organised crime, and numerous challenges need to be urgently addressed 
if it is to be combatted. Understanding the organised crime-terrorism nexus at the present moment could 
not be more vital. Indeed, Brexit and potential implications for the Irish border present by far the most 
important challenge to the Good Friday Agreement since its adoption and, as a corollary, ensuring that 
paramilitary groups do not utilise their capacity to re-engage in acts of terrorism. As part of the initial 
steps towards a solution to some of these challenges, the Northern Ireland model therefore represents a 
useful tool that could be harnessed, and built upon, by policy makers and government agencies for 





One of the most important legacies of the ‘Troubles’1 in Northern Ireland and the ensuing twenty years 
post peace-process era, heralded by the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998,2 is the rise and 
formation of a complex and diverse array of Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups and 
approximately 230 organised criminal groups engaging in a wide range of criminal and cross-border 
activities.3 Northern Ireland is the current location of fourteen proscribed terrorist groups,4 the lineage 
of which can all be traced back to organisations that waged campaigns of political violence during the 
Troubles.5 Much like the emergence of the ‘new’ terrorism,6 epitomised by al Qaeda and its affiliates 
since the 1990s,7 many of these paramilitary groups are comprised of loose, autonomous and amorphous 
networks of individuals and operate transnationally.8 Yet, others maintain a centralised hierarchy and 
command structure and, similar to ISIS until its military defeat and the demise of the caliphate in Iraq 
and Syria in 2017,9 are geographically local with community roots, ideologically driven and act as a 
                                                          
1 The Troubles refers to a violent thirty-year armed conflict in Northern Ireland involving on one side terrorist paramilitary 
groups fighting for the unification of Ireland (Republican) and on the other side those fighting for Northern Ireland to remain 
part of the UK (Loyalist).  
2 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
Ireland, April 10, 1998, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement (accessed March 6, 2019). 
3 Interview. See also House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 
Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), paras. 3–4; Independent Monitoring Commission, Third Report of the 
Independent Monitoring Commission (HC 1218, London, The Stationery Office, November 4, 2004), paras. 5, 13. 
4 Home Office, Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, March 1, 2019, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/783067/proscribed-
terrorist-organisations.pdf (accessed March 6, 2019). 
5 Interview. According to government agencies within Northern Ireland, the designation of these fourteen groups as terrorist 
organizations is due to historical and political reasons. Legally, some remain designated as terrorist organizations but 
politically they are not treated as terrorist organizations as they have decommissioned and are committed to the peace process. 
However, these organizations are essentially the same in their organizational structure, modi operandi and capacity to commit 
terrorist violence as many of the other paramilitary groups that have not been designated as terrorist organizations. In the 
present article, terrorist and paramilitary groups are used interchangeably.  
6 Peter Neumann, Old and New Terrorism (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009); Bruce Hoffmann, “Rethinking Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25(5) (2002): 303–316, doi: 10.1080/105761002901223; Paul 
Wilkinson, (2005). “International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU’s Response” (Chaillot Paper No. 84, Institute 
for Security Studies, European Union, Paris, October 2005).  
7 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and its Evolution”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
33, no. 12 (2010): 1043–1078, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860; Johnathon Stevenson, “Al-Qaeda’s Evolution Since 
9/11”, Strategic Comments 23(8) (2017): vii–viii, doi: 10.1080/13567888.2017.1385982. 
8 Interview.  
9 The military defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Da’esh) in 2017 has forced the group to evolve and transform from 
a hierarchically organised group, concentrating on conquering and holding territory, to a covert, networked group with a flat 
hierarchy and cells and affiliates increasingly acting autonomously. Despite many Islamic State fighters and commanders 
being killed, members of the group have fled to neighbouring States seeking refuge, while 20,000-30,000 members are hiding 
out in sympathetic communities in Iraq and Syria. ISIS members have established in Libya, Algeria, Morocco as well as Asia, 
including Bangladesh and the Philippines. It is therefore likely that an Islamic State group core will survive for the foreseeable 
future. Letter dated 17 January 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 
1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, 
groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2018/14/Rev.1, February 27, 
2018; Letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 
(2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, 
undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2018/705, July 27, 2018; Phill Hynes, 
“As ISIS Winds Down In Syria and Iraq, a New Hotbed of Terror Is Created — In Asia,” Frontera, August 2, 2016. 
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quasi-state by exerting coercive ‘control’ and ‘influence’ over territory and local communities where 
they operate.10 All of the more prominent paramilitary organisations operating during the Troubles 
remain in existence, some of which continue to recruit new members, acquire money, weapons and 
explosives, and retain and even develop their capacity for resuming violent campaigns in the future 
should they consider it desirable, despite being on ceasefire and ostensibly committed to peace.11 
Dissident Republican groups, that reject the 1998 Agreement, pose a significant threat to Northern 
Ireland’s stability and security.12 In the ten years to 2018, there were 610 shooting incidents and 499 
bombing incidents related to paramilitarism, including attacks directed as PSNI officers.13 Moreover, 
2016 and 2017 witnessed eight national security attacks14 and between 2016 and 2018 313 individuals 
were arrested and 31 charged for offences related to terrorism.15 The result is that Northern Ireland has 
established itself as not only the most concentrated area of terrorist activity but also the centrepiece of 
convergence between ‘terrorism’ and ‘organised crime’ in Europe.16 
 
                                                          
10 Until its military defeat, Da’esh had an Islamist caliphate in the heart of the Middle East and exerted control over an estimated 
90,000 square kilometres of territory and a taxable population of seven to eight million people, as well as oilfields and 
refineries, vast grain stores, lucrative smuggling routes and vast stockpiles of arms and ammunition, making it the strongest, 
best resourced and most ideologically potent terrorist quasi-State of the post-9/11 era. At the same time, Da’esh was 
transnational in nature by attracting tens of thousands of foreign fighters from over 100 countries and creating the necessary 
infrastructure to carry out significant external terrorist attacks. Jason Burke, “Rise and Fall of Isis: Its Dream of a Caliphate is 
Over, so What Now?,” The Guardian, October 21, 2017. 
11 The UVF, UDA and INLA are reported to still be recruiting new members. Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, “An 
Assessment Commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary 
Groups Focusing on those which Declared Ceasefires in Order to Support and Facilitate the Political Process,” October 19, 
2015, para. 2. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, 
Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 68.  
12 Since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the Republican paramilitary dominance of the PIRA has been 
replaced by the violent dissident Republicans (VDR), a set of groups whose aim is to maintain the paramilitary conflict in the 
pursuit of a united Ireland. They reject the legitimacy of the peace process and believe that Sinn Fein and the PIRA have sold 
out the Republican community through their engagement in the politics of normalisation. See John Horgan and John Morrison, 
“Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
23(4) (2011), p. 642–669, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2011.594924. 
13 PSNI Statistics Branch, “Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics 1 September 2017 to 31 August 2018”, September 7, 
2018. See also Lord Alderdice, John McBurney and Monica McWilliams, “The Fresh Start Panel Report on the Disbandment 
of Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland” (Northern Ireland Executive, June 7, 2016), para. 2.7; Rachel Monaghan and Peter 
Shirlow, “Forward to the Past? Loyalist Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland Since 1994,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34(8) 
(2011), p.649–665, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2011.583205; John Morrison and John Horgan, “Reloading the Armalite? Victims 
and Targets of Violent Dissident Irish Republicanism 2007-2015,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28(3) (2016),p. 576–597, 
doi: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1155940. According to Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, An Assessment Commissioned 
by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Structure, Role and Purpose of Paramilitary Groups, para. 2, there were 
between 15 to 40 attacks annually between 2000 to 2015 inclusive primarily directed at PSNI officers.  
14 See Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Official Report 18 July 2017, p. 1590. 
15 Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation: Annual Statistics 2016/17, Northern Ireland Office, November 7, 2017, pp.7–12; 
Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation: Annual Statistics 2017/18, Northern Ireland Office, November 7, 2018, pp.7–12. 
16 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report 2016–2017, HC 655 (December 2017), p.27.  
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Schmid rightly observes that not much of the growing literature discussing the relationship between 
terrorism and organised crime ‘has bothered to clearly define these concepts’, both of which are 
contested.17 There is presently no agreement among states, and certainly no internationally codified 
definition in a multilateral treaty, of ‘terrorism’.18 Similarly, there is no internationally agreed definition 
of ‘organised crime’, although the international community was able to reach agreement on a broad 
definition of ‘organised criminal group’ in Article 2 of the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.19 For the purposes of this article we rely on the definitions of these offences as they 
apply to Northern Ireland. Organised crime therefore refers to ‘a group of two or more people who are 
engaged in serious criminal activities, usually with the aim of generating material gain;’20 and terrorism 
is defined in section 1 of The Terrorism Act 2000, which applies to the whole of the UK.21  
 
During the past twenty years, a wave of scholarship has examined the relationship between crime and 
terrorism.22 Leading scholars have developed a number of theoretical models that attempt to explain the 
                                                          
17 Alex P Schmid, “Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime 22 Years 
Later” (Research Paper, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague (2018), pp. 1–40, doi: 
10.19165/2018.1.06. 
18 Ben Saul, “Terrorism as a Legal Concept,” in Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism, ed. Genevieve Lennon and Clive 
Walker (London, Routledge, 2015), pp.19–38. 
19 Neil Boister, “The UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000,” in International Law and Transnational 
Organized Crime, ed. Pierre Hauck and Sven Peterke (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), 126–149. 
20 Department of Justice, “Organised Crime Task Force Annual Report and Threat Assessment 2017-18: Organised Crime in 
Northern Ireland” (2018), https://www.justice-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/justice/octf-2017-18-annual-
report.pdf (accessed March 7, 2019), p. 6. See also Department of Justice, “The Northern Ireland Organised Crime Strategy” 
(Organised Crime Task Force (2016), 
https://www.octf.gov.uk/OCTF/media/OCTF/documents/publications/N.I.%20Organised%20Crime%20Strategy/The-NI-
Organised-Crime-Strategy-April-2016.pdf?ext=.pdf (accessed March 7, 2019). The definition in Northern Ireland is slightly 
different to that provided by the UK’s National Crime Agency: “Organised crime can be defined as serious crime planned, 
coordinated and conducted by people working together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, 
financial gain. Organised criminals working together for a particular criminal activity or activities are called an organised 
crime group.” National Crime Agency, “Organised Crime Groups”, http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-
threats/organised-crime-groups (accessed March 7, 2019).  
21 The definition of terrorism is contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The current definition refers to the use or 
threat of action involving serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, the endangerment of a persons life, 
the creation of a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public, or serious interference with or 
seriously disrupting an electronic system where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public of a section of it. See further R v Gul (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 64. 
22 See, e.g., Erik Alda and Joseph L Sala, “Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the Sahel 
Region,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 3, no. 1 (2014): 1–9; doi: 10.5334/sta.ea; Rajan Basra, 
Peter R Neumann and Claudia Brunner, (2016) “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-
Terror Nexus” (International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 2016); Sergei Boeke, “Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (5) (2016), pp. 
914–936, doi: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1208280; Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28(3) (2005), pp. 237–252, doi: 10.1080/10576100590928124; Michael Fredholm, 
Transnational Organized Crime and Jihadist Terrorism: Russian-Speaking Networks in Western Europe (New York, 
Routledge, 2017); Annette Hübschle, “From Theory to Practice: Exploring the Organised Crime-Terror Nexus in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” Perspectives on Terrorism 5(3–4) (2011), pp. 81–95; Leslie Holmes, ed., Terrorism, Organised Crime and 
Corruption: Networks and Linkages (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007); Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror 
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nexus between crime and terrorism in different regions of the world, including the organisational, 
institutional and social interactions between the perpetrators of organised crime and terrorism; a diverse 
range of sporadic, temporary, opportunistic and long-lasting linkages between the phenomena; and a 
variety of cultural, ethnic, familial affiliations, ideological and financial motivations that may mould 
them together.23 In the Northern Ireland context, leading scholars have examined the rise, composition, 
characteristics, behaviour, tactics and impact of paramilitary organisations,24 as well as their interest in 
organised crime as a source of funding.25 Yet this body of scholarship has not been located within the 
emerging body of academic work addressing the crime-terror nexus, which is largely dedicated to 
identifying and accurately understanding the dynamic interactions between these phenomena. This is 
despite paramilitary groups being heavily involved in and significantly facilitating the growing 
                                                          
Nexus: Do Threat Perceptions Align with Reality?,” in eds. Felicia Allum, Francesca Lono, Daniela Irrera and Panos A 
Kostakos, Defining and Defying Organised Crime: Discourse, Perceptions and Reality (London, Routledge, 2010), 180–192; 
Tamara Makarenko and Mesquita, Michael, “Categorising the Crime–Terror Nexus in the European Union,” Global Crime 
15(3-4) (2014), pp. 259–274, doi: 10.1080/17440572.2014.931227; John T Picarelli, “Osama bin Corleone? Vito the Jackal? 
Framing Threat Convergence Through an Examination of Transnational Organised Crime and International Terrorism,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 24(2) (2012), pp. 180–198, doi: DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.648349; Tuesday, Reitano, 
Colin Clarke and Laura Adal, “Examining the Nexus between Organised Crime and Terrorism and its Implications for EU 
Programming” (Counter-Terrorism Monitoring, Reporting and Support Mechanism, European Union, 2017); James Windle, 
John Morrison, Aaron Winter and Andrew Silke, eds., Historical Perspectives on Organised Crime and Terrorism (London, 
Routledge, 2017). 
23 E.g., Phil Williams, (1998) “Terrorism and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus or Transformation?” in Gunnar Jervas 
(ed), FOA Report on Terrorism, Swedish Defence Research Establishment, p. 69-92; Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror 
Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism Global Crime 6(1) (2004), p. 129-
145; Louise I. Shelley and John T. Picarelli et al. "Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized 
Crime & International Terrorism," US Department of Justice (2005); Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, "A Crime–Terror 
Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30:12 (2007), 
p.1095-1107; Santiago Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid Criminal 
Organisations” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6:2 (2011),p. 121-136; Tamara Makarenko, “Europe's 
Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union,” Directorate General for 
Internal Policies - Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs (2012); Marinko Bobic, "Transnational 
Organised Crime and Terrorism: Nexus Needing a Human Security Framework” Global Crime 15:3-4 (2014),p. 241-258;  
24 E.g., John F. Morrison, “Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits” 
(Bloomsbury Press, New York, 2014); John F. Morrison “Fighting talk: The statements of The IRA/New IRA,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 28(3) (2016a) p.598–619; John F. Morrison and John Horgan, “Reloading the Armalite? Victims and Targets 
of Violent Dissident Irish Republicanism 2007-2015,” Terrorism and Political Violence 28(3) 2016; John F. Morrison 
“Copying to be different: violent dissident Irish Republican learning,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40(7) (2017), pp.586-
602.  
25 To date, a number of studies have noted links between organised crime and terrorist financing in Northern Ireland. For 
example, Andrew Silke, “In Defence of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland – Part One: Extortion 
and Blackmail”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21(4) (1998): 331–361; John Horgan and Max Taylor, Playing the Green 
Card – financing the Provisional IRA: part 1, Terrorism and Political Violence 11(2) (1999), 1-38; Andrew Silke, “Drink, 
drugs and rock ‘n’ roll: financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland – part two., Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23:2 
(2000), p.107-127; Richard Evans, “Organised crime and terrorism financing in Northern Ireland, Intelligence Review 14(9) 
(2002) 26-29; John Horgan and Max Taylor, Playing the Green Card – financing the Provisional IRA: part 2, Terrorism and 
Political Violence 15(2) (2003), 1-60; Jon Moran, “Paramilitaries, ‘ordinary decent criminals’ and the development of 
organised crime following the Belfast agreement,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 32 (2004), 263-278; Ryan 
Clarke and Stuart Lee, “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 
(2008): 376–395; Niahm Hourigan, John Morrison, James Windle and Andrew Silke, “Crime in Ireland North and South: 
Feuding Gangs and Profiteering Paramilitaries,” Trends in Organised Crime 21(2) (2018), pp 126–146; Peng Wang, “The 




phenomenon of organised crime in Northern Ireland and beyond.26 It is not possible to understand 
organised crime in Northern Ireland without also understanding the role that Republican and Loyalist 
paramilitaries play in these activities.27 Conversely, it is essential to understand the involvement of 
paramilitaries in organised crime and the ways in which organised criminal groups facilitate 
paramilitary groups in their financing, access to weapons and explosives and capacity to commit 
terrorist violence if they are to be effectively countered.28 Neither phenomena can be viewed and 
combatted in isolation.29  
 
Empirically informed by a wide range of sources, including police, intelligence and government reports 
and interviews with experts from government agencies within Northern Ireland,30 this article therefore 
aims to fill an important gap in existing scholarship by shedding new light on the complex and dynamic 
linkages between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland.31 In order to so, it develops a new 
theoretical model of the terrorism-organised crime nexus designed specifically for application to 
Northern Ireland. This ‘Northern Ireland Terrorism-Organised Crime Interaction Model’ (Northern 
Ireland model) builds upon crime-terror models in existing scholarship. However, it represents a radical 
departure from these theoretical frameworks intended for universal application in important ways, as 
they do not capture the historical evolution, synergies and interactions between terrorism and crime in 
Northern Ireland. Nor, for that matter, are these existing models necessarily able to explain the nexus 
in other parts of the world. Thus, while the Northern Ireland model is primarily intended for application 
to Northern Ireland, it is not limited to that jurisdiction alone. Indeed, as both the organised crime and 
                                                          
26 In 2005 the Independent Monitoring Commision reported that “because of […] paramilitary involvement, organised crime 
is the biggest long-term threat to the rule of law in Northern Ireland.” 
27 Hourigan, Crime in Ireland, 137. 
28 Interview. House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth 
Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 32. 
29 Interview.  
30 The identities of these experts remain anonymous for security reasons. We refer to them in generic terms as ‘government 
experts’ to protect their anonymity as disclosure of their roles in their organisations may reveal their identity. It is important 
to note, at the outset, that the nature and extent of the crime-terror nexus does not always correlate with criminal prosecutions 
as this may not always be deemed the most efficient or effective means of disrupting criminal activity and there may also be 
issues of obtaining evidence to the requisite standard of proof and potentially revealing sensitive sources of intelligence; as 
such, the nexus also has to established and mapped by intelligence gathered from investigations by various government 
agencies. Additionally, there are always issues of accuracy when relying on reports of newspapers, media accounts and 
scholarship. In an effort to counterbalance this, we have had our findings verified and corroborated by government agencies.  
31 Additionally, this article is informed by the present authors’ experience and insight in leading, in 2018, a project on the links 
between terrorism and crime from a global perspective on behalf of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.  
7 
 
paramilitary groups and their activities in Northern Ireland are international in their reach and effect, 
impacting numerous other states, it is not possible to understand and combat the nexus exclusively from 
a Northern Ireland perspective. The model is intended as a response to recent calls from the Global 
Counterterrorism Forum32 and the UN Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee33 for more 
research to be conducted to better understand the nature and scope of the nexus and enhance intelligence 
sharing and co-operation to counter it. Having recently led a project at the UN in identifying and 
analysing the linkages between organised crime and terrorism and existing scholarship discussing this 
relationship form a global perspective, the authors believe that the Northern Ireland model and 
variations of its constituent components have a broader application for mapping and understanding the 
nexus in numerous other jurisdictions.34 
 
Accurately identifying and understanding the dynamic interactions between organised crime and 
terrorism at the present moment could not be more important. The UK Government has recognised that 
‘more analysis needs to be done as to whether these threats [terrorism and organised crime] are 
converging and, if they are, what this means for the safety and security of the UK.’35 The Home Office 
subsequently acknowledged that there exist gaps in knowledge and understanding on the synergies and 
overlaps between terrorism and organised crime and that better understanding of the relationship 
between them is a research priority in order to maximise the effectiveness and efficiency in response.36 
In addition, in recent years, this issue has become a priority concern for many states and the UN Security 
Council. Thus, in 2014 the Council adopted resolution 2195 on the interaction between terrorism and 
organised crime and its impact on international peace and security, calling upon states to better 
                                                          
32 “The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Global Counterterrorism 
Forum, p.4. Available at https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/C/GCTF-Good-Practices-
on-the-Nexus_ENG.pdf?ver=2018-09-21-122246-363 (accessed 6 March 2019). 
33 “Concept note, Open Briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the nexus between international terrorism and 
transnational organized crime,” Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), 8 October 2018, p.2. 
34 It also has to be borne in mind that, in applying the Northern Ireland model to other jurisdictions, states define the concepts 
of ‘organised crime’ and ‘terrorism’ differently, often in radically different ways, and sometimes not at all.  
35 HM Government, “Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime,” (2011), para. 44. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97823/organised-crime-strategy.pdf (accessed 
6 March 2019). 
36 Home Office, “Future Directions for Organised Crime Research,” (2011). Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116653/future-organised-crime-res-2011.pdf 
(accessed 6 March 2019). 
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understand and address the nexus between these phenomena.37 In response to this resolution UNICRI,38 
UNODC,39 EU40 and the Council of Europe41 have been working expeditiously to produce policies on 
how to better understand and counter both threats.42  
 
 In spite of this there remains a dearth of robust evidence-based analyses of the nexus. Indeed, existing 
analyses tend to generalise from a few prominent examples to across-the-board conclusions and theories 
between the two phenomena, potentially resulting in unwarranted exaggeration and inaccuracy. The 
present article, by providing one of the few up to date and empirically informed analyses of the nexus, 
therefore aims to make a valuable contribution to the current evidence base. It is perhaps worth noting 
that, during the UN Security Council meeting at which resolution 2195 was adopted, discussion among 
delegates focused primarily on the nexus in Africa and the situation in Northern Ireland was 
overlooked.43 The present research reveals that the nexus in Northern Ireland is no less problematic, 
and because of the transnational nature of some of the linkages, that it has implications for security and 
law enforcement in numerous other states. The findings of this research could be used as a basis by the 
UN, and by security and law enforcement bodies in the UK and other jurisdictions influenced by 
                                                          
37 S/RES/2195, 19 December 2014. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the threat of terrorists benefiting from 
transnational organized crime, UN Doc. S/2015/366, 21 May 2015. 
38 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and Thailand Institute of Justice, “Breaking 
the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic Approaches,” Meeting Report (2016).   
39 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Countering Illicit Arms Trafficking and its Links to Terrorism and 
Other Serious Crime” (2017) STEPPING UP INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE NEXUS BETWEEN 
TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE? Organized by the 
Government of the Netherlands, Interpol and the UNODC Terrorism Prevention Branch, (2017), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND_CCPCJ_joint/Side_Events/2017/17-
02842_CCPCJ_programme_ebook.pdf. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and 
Thailand Institute of Justice (2016) “Breaking the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic 
Approaches,” Meeting Report, http://unicri.it/in_focus/files/NEXUS_REPORT_UNICRI.pdf.  
40 Makarenko, Tamara (2012) “Europe's Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the 
European Union,” Directorate General for Internal Policies - Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs; 
Tamara Makarenko, “Address to the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money 
Laundering”, (2013). Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201302/20130221ATT61506/20130221ATT61506EN.pdf; Reitano, 
et al, “Examining the Nexus;” See also European Police Office (Europol), “Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) 
Revisited” (The Hague: Europol, 2016); European Police Force, “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report” 
(The Hague: Europol, 2017). Interpol, INTERPOL launches project to counter terrorism in South and Southeast Asia, 30 
August 2017, https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2017/N2017-110. 
41 Council of Europe, 2nd Conference on Terrorism and Organised Crime, 21-22 September 2017, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/counter-terrorism/terrorism-and-organised-crime-2017. 
42 The UNICRI initiative resulted in the development of The Hague Good Practices on the Nexus between Transnational 
Organized Crime and Terrorism, endorsed at the Ninth Global Counter-Terrorism Forum Ministerial Plenary Meeting in New 
York in September 2018. See “The Hague Good Practices.”  
43 7351st mtg., 19 Dec. 2014. 
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interactions between crime and terror in Northern Ireland, to identify and understand the various types 
of interaction and formulate policy to counter them.  
 
Countering the nexus has become an urgent priority for Northern Ireland.  Significant steps have been 
taken by paramilitary groups on ceasefire to transition and decommission, resulting in far fewer 
numbers of shootings, bombings, assaults and destruction of property.44 However, twenty years after 
the start of a number of landmark ceasefires, paramilitary groups continue to exist and impact adversely 
on communities in Northern Ireland.45 After 11 weeks of intensive negotiations, in November 2015 the 
Northern Ireland Executive and the UK and Irish Governments adopted the Fresh Start Agreement 
committing to address the legacy of the Troubles by ending all paramilitary activity and the disbanding 
of all organisations and their structures, as well as their links with organised and cross-border crime.46 
However, the leaderships of existing paramilitary groups remain unwilling to disband.47 This would 
suggest that paramilitary groups will continue to retain their organisational structures, revered 
reputations, membership, training and expertise and funding for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, they 
are facilitating and heavily involved in widespread organised crime, not only in Northern Ireland but 
also in the Republic of Ireland, the UK and beyond.48 A newly created Paramilitary Crime Task Force 
(PCTF) is specifically monitoring 100 organised criminal gangs, twenty five percent of which, it is 
estimated, have associations with paramilitary organisations.49 Paramilitary engagement in organised 
crime is likely to improve the ability of the paramilitaries to control the localities in which they are 
predominately based, expand their criminal enterprises, and enhance their capacity for conducting 
                                                          
44 The Fresh Start Panel Report on the Disbandment of Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland (2016), paras. 2.7-2.23. 
Available at 
https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/newnigov/The%20Fresh%20Start%20Panel%20report%2
0on%20the%20disbandment%20of%20paramilitary%20groups.pdf (accessed 6 March 2019). 
45 Ibid. 
46 A Fresh Start The Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan (2015) Available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479116/A_Fresh_Start_-
_The_Stormont_Agreement_and_Implementation_Plan_-_Final_Version_20_Nov_2015_for_PDF.pdf (accessed 6 March 
2019). 
47 The Fresh Start Panel Report 
48 See also “Organised Crime Task Force, 2017-18 Annual Report and Threat Assessment, Organised Crime in Northern 
Ireland,” Appendix 2 (2018).  
49  The Task Force was established in September 2017 as part of the commitment to tackle paramilitary activity in Northern 
Ireland set out in the Fresh Start Agreement. It was to include 40 PSNI officers, 22 NCA personnel and 10 customs officers 
and to receive £25million over 5 years; see Vincent Kearney, V. ‘New taskforce to tackle paramilitaries’ BBC, 27 September 
2017. Available at  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-41407322; interview. 
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terrorist attacks.50 Policing the ‘security situation’ caused by paramilitaries costs the police service in 
Northern Ireland approximately £300 million of its annual budget.51 Brexit also has potential 
implications for the Irish border and presents by far the most important challenge to the Good Friday 
Agreement since its adoption amid concern that a return to a hard border between Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland, complete with customs and other checks, could mark a return to political 
violence orchestrated by paramilitary groups.52  
 
Part one introduces the new Northern Ireland model and outlines its main constituent elements. This is 
followed, in part two, by a more in-depth analysis of each of these components of interactions with 
respect to a number of prominent paramilitary groups. Viewed through the prism of the Northern Ireland 
model, part three details important findings and major trends as well as their implications for the 
executive and law enforcement before concluding. 
 
 
Part I: A New Terrorism-Organised Crime Model for Northern Ireland     
The Northern Ireland model is comprised of five components of interaction—namely, ‘alliances,’ 
‘assimilation’, ‘hybrids’, ‘transformation’ and ‘conflicts’53. These classifications are adopted in order 
to capture the organisational and operational dynamics of a diverse range of possible interactions 
between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland (including ambiguous and largely 
autonomous networks of individuals within particular groups who immerse themselves in organised 
crime, not necessarily for terrorism but for self-enrichment), and to try to shed light on the current 
evolutionary status of paramilitary organisations as politically and criminally motivated entities.54  
 
                                                          
50 Interview. 
51  The Fresh Start Panel Report, p.11.  
52 The term ‘Brexit’ refers to Britain’s decision to exit from the European Union following a referendum held on 23 June 2016. 
See Mark Daly, Pat Dolan and Mark Brennan, “Northern Ireland Returning to Violence as a Result of a Hard Border due to 
Brexit or a Rushed Border Poll: Risks to Youth,” UNESCO, February 2019. Available at 
https://senatormarkdaly.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/unesco-chairs-report-brexit-return-to-violence.pdf (accessed 6 March 
2019). See also Police Remuneration Review Body, “Fourth Report on Northern Ireland 2018” (May 25, 2018), 7–9. 
53 We do not include corruption in this model due to a lack of empirical evidence but note that in jurisdictions impacted by the 
nexus between terrorism and organized crime in Northern Ireland corruption may be an additional component of interaction 
54 It is important to note that these constituent elements are not necessarily self-contained and there may in some cases be 
overlap between activity assimilation and alliances.   
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Diagram inserted here: Northern Ireland Terrorism-Organised Crime Interaction Model 
 
The main paramilitary groups examined within this model are the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(PIRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Ulster Defence Association (UDA), Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) and Action Against Drugs (AAD), as well as violent dissident Republicans groups, 
including the ‘Real’ Irish Republican Army (RIRA), ‘New’ IRA (NIRA) ‘Continuity’ IRA (CIRA) and 
Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH). We concentrate on these groups because, in developing the Northern 
Ireland model, an evidence-led approach is adopted, and they were discussed during interviews. 
Additionally, the UDA, UVF and INLA are proscribed terrorist organizations and are amongst the main 
targets being investigated by the newly established Paramilitary Crime Task Force.55  Moreover, 
dissident Republican groups, such as CIRA, NIRA and RIRA, which are not on ceasefire and wage 
armed campaigns, continue to pose the greatest threat to Northern Ireland’s national security.56  
 
It is useful at the outset to explain briefly each of the constituent components of the Northern Ireland 
model. Alliance is understood as a functional and cooperative relationship between different terrorist 
groups as well as between terrorist and criminal groups or individuals within such groups for mutual 
benefit. Scholars including Williams, Makarenko and Shelley have alluded to the benefits accruing to 
both types of groups by forming alliances with each other.57  Dishman has, however, been sceptical of 
the existence of cooperative relationships and dismissed them in the context of the PIRA.58 We 
nevertheless maintain that alliances are significant features of crime-terror interaction in Northern 
Ireland The nature and level of sophistication of alliances varies and include, for example, sharing of 
                                                          
55 Home Office, “List of Proscribed Terrorist Groups or Organisations,” p.21. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2 (accessed 7 March 2019). 
56 Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, An assessment commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the 
structure, role and purpose of paramilitary groups focusing on those which declared ceasefires in order to support and 
facilitate the political process, 19 October 2015, para. 2; Fresh Start Panel report, para. 2.7. For example, NIRA are alleged to 
have been responsible for the bomb attack in Derry on 19 January 2019. See Rory Carroll, “Derry bomb attack: Northern 
Ireland police arrest four men,” Guardian 20 January 2019. 
57 Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” p.70; Makarenko, “The Crime–Terror Continuum” p. 131; Makarenko, 
“Categorising”, p.260; Shelley “Methods and Motives”, p.37. Williams and Shelley at al. refer to this type of linkage as a 
‘nexus.’ 
58 Dishman, “Terrorism,” p. 48-49; see also Peng Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus”, p. 15. 
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operations as well as exchange of goods and services.59 Even where paramilitaries are from opposing 
sides of the political divide they have been willing to work together in the pursuit of profit derived from 
organised crime.60 In this analysis, alliance also includes the transfer of skills from members of one 
group to another to help them acquire knowledge and expertise necessary for conducting criminal 
activities without detection. In this way the Interaction Model is able to capture important transfers of 
operational, organisational, technological, and strategic skills from Republican terrorism.61 Prominent 
examples of cooperative alliances between terrorist groups involving knowledge and technical expertise 
transfers include the involvement of PIRA explosives engineers in the training of Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas in Colombia, in exchange for money derived from the FARC’s 
strong links with the Colombian drug trade, as well as an ability of PIRA members to test and improve 
new weapons and methods of destruction for use elsewhere.62 Similarly, bombing techniques used by 
the PIRA were passed on to the Taliban via al Qaeda, which had learned the process through the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Hezbollah, which had, in turn, previously been trained by 
                                                          
59 Europol, “EU Drug Markets Report. In-Depth Analysis,” 2016, p.18. Available at 
http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/2373/TD0216072ENN.PDF (accessed 7 March 2019). 
60 House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, “The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland,” Fourth Report 
of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 22. 
61 The need for expanding tactical expertise led the PIRA, and other republican groups, to seek direct training from international 
allies to complement their own internal training. In the 1970s it is widely believed that both the Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA), and the PIRA, received training in Palestine from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). See John F. Morrison 
and Paul Gill, “100 Years of Irish Republican Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 28:3, (2016) 409, 411; Morrison, 
“Copying to be Different,” 589. 
62 These three men—Niall Connolly, Martin McCauley, and James Monaghan—indicted in Columbia in 2002 for training 
FARC militants in the use of explosives, including homemade mortars, and, in 2004, were sentenced to 17 years in prison. It 
is important to keep in mind that this is not the first time that FARC and PIRA have allegedly exchanged knowledge and 
information. PIRA purportedly initiated contact with FARC in 1997 through the ETA, with which PIRA has a long-standing 
relationship and has exchanged knowledge and technical know-how, particularly in bomb making. According to an April 2002 
U.S. Department of State report, one of the three PIRA men, Connolly, Sinn Fein’s representative in Cuba, initiated the contact 
with FARC in 1997; and, from 1998 to 2001, at least 15 PIRA militants travelled to Colombia, along with Iranian, Cuban, and 
Basque terrorists, to train FARC. One expert alleged that senior PIRA leaders would have sanctioned this kind of an exchange 
of technology with another militant group, even though they are publicly adhering to a cease-fire. Notably, PIRA has a long-
standing policy prohibiting “freelancing” by its members; as such, the Colombia Three did not likely act alone, despite 
vehement denials from Sinn Fein, which does not want to be seen as violating the cease-fire. U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, responding to the information that this relationship developed after the 1997 peace process began in Northern Ireland, 
said on a trip to Bogotá in December 2002 that the groups were “sharing experiences and knowledge.” For a case study 
examining the exchange of technology and knowledge between the PIRA and the FARC, see Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk, Sara 
A. Daly and Brian A. Jackson, “Sharing the Dragon's Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies,” RAND 
Corporation (2007), ch. 5. See also House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 5; Hearing before the Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives, “International Global Terrorism. It’s Links with Illicit Drugs as Illustrated by the IRA 
and other Groups in Colombia,” (April, 2002). Available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa78947.000/hfa78947_0f.htm (accessed 7 March 2019). 
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the PIRA in Lebanon.63  The outsourcing of the expertise of PIRA members has been connected also 
with groups in Iran, the Basque region and Cuba.64 
 
Assimilation involves the adoption by terrorists or organised criminals of the activities of the other 
without the individuals concerned or their respective organisations working together or forming an 
alliance.65 This includes situations where paramilitary organisations develop criminal enterprises in-
house and, in the process, engage in criminal activities normally associated with organised crime 
groups. This type of interaction is well-established in academic literature on the crime terror nexus. 
Dishman66, Williams,67 Shelley and Picarelli68 have, for example, all noted imitatation by terrorist 
groups of criminal behaviour normally associated with criminal gangs, and this phenomenon is also 
referenced in the first plane of Makarenko’s revised crime-terror model for the nexus in the European 
Union.69  
 
Conflict refers to the spectrum of feuds and hostilities that occur among paramilitary groups and 
between them and organised criminal groups.70 These conflicts may arise, for example, due to a break-
down of an alliance, or because a terrorist group frowns on drug dealing or other criminal activity taking 
place on its turf, or for reasons of rivalry for control of a particular criminal market. Conflicts are 
overlooked in existing crime-terror models, yet they have the ability to influence the dynamic 
interactions between paramilitary and criminal groups.  
 
Hybrids have been presented in scholarship as typifying a convergence between separate terrorist and 
organised criminal groups.71 Shelley and Picarelli positioned hybrid entities at the end-point of their 
                                                          
63 David Bamber, “The IRA ‘is Teaching Palestinians how to blow up Israeli Soldiers’ in West Bank,” The Telegraph 28 April 
2002; Jim Cusack, “Taliban Using IRA Bomb Techniques in Terror War,” Irish Independent 3 June 2007. 
64 Andrew Alderson, David Bamber and Francis Elliott,  “IRA’s Involvement in International Terrorism,” The Daily Telegraph 
28 April 2002. 
65 Shelley and Picarelli, “Methods and Motives,” p.36. 
66 Dishman, “ Terrorism” p.48-49. 
67 Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” p.70. 
68 Shelley and Picarelli, “Methods and Motives,” p.53 
69 Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” p.260. 
70 The importance of conflicts that occur between terrorist groups and organised criminal groups has recently been highlighted 
by Hourington et al.  
71 Shelley and Picarelli, “Methods and Motives,” p.54; Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” p.260. 
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spectrum of interaction between crime and terror groups, regarding it as one of the last phases of an 
evolutionary course of merger between the two types of groups.72 Makarenko’s revised model of 
interaction noted that hybrids also form when one type of group adopts the tactics of the other. In a 
similar manner, for this analysis we regard hybrids as forming when paramilitary organisations maintain 
campaigns of violence grounded in political ideology, or retain the capacity to commit such violence, 
while also engaging in criminality by appropriating activities or forming alliances with criminal 
groups.73 In Northern Ireland, all paramilitary groups either are or have been hybrids.74 During the 
Troubles, the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries engaged in organized crime as a method of 
terrorist financing, but also at times as a means of lining their own pockets.75 This organised criminal 
activity continues to the present day. Unlike the observations of some leading scholars, which establish 
a dichotomy between crime and terrorism, it is difficult to make any clear distinction between these 
phenomena in Northern Ireland.76 Recognising this, and to capture the realties of linkages between 
organised crime and terrorism in Northern Ireland, we place hybrids not at the end of a linear model but 
centre stage in a circular model of interaction. 
 
 
The final element of the model refers to the transformation of an organisation from one type of entity 
to another. Identified by Dishman77, Williams78, Shelley and Picarelli 79 and Makarenko80, this type of 
interaction typically accounts for situations where terrorist groups and criminal organisations change 
their objectives and activities to such a degree that they transition from political terrorism to criminal 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 We are concerned with this relationship in this analysis rather than the additional possibility of organised criminal groups 
adopting terrorist tactics as we find no evidence of this development in Northern Ireland. This is not to adopt Shelley’s 
definition of a hybrid which normally envisaged a convergence of separate terrorist and organised crime groups. 
74 Interview. 
75 Interview. See also House of Commons Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs, Third Report, June 28, 2006, paras. 
11–12, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmniaf/886/88605.htm#n44; House of Commons Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee, The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, para. 18.  
76 For debates on the dichotomy see, for example, Alison Jamieson, “The Use of Terrorism and Organized Crime”, in Root 
Causes of Terrorism. Proceedings from an International Expert Meeting, Tore Bjørgo, ed., Conference Report, The Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, (Oslo, 9-11 June 2003), p.169. See also Louise I. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, 
Crime and Terrorism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 113.  
77 Dishman, “Terrorism,” p.47-50. 
78 Williams, “Terrorism and Organized Crime,” p.71. 
79 Shelley and Picarelli, “Methods and Motives,” p.36. 
80 Makarenko, “The Crime–Terror Continuum,” p.135; Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” p. 261. 
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enterprise or vice versa. This may be as a result of achieving their political aims, reduced support for 
those aims, or a realisation of the futility of terrorist actions to achieve them following years of 
attritional state intervention. The Northern Ireland model identifies three subsets of this type of 
interaction, namely ‘minor’, ‘partial’ and ‘complete’ transformation in order to accurately reflect the 
transitional status of paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland.  
 
Complete transformation refers to situations where a paramilitary group disbands and ceases to exist 
and does not engage in either political violence or organised crime. It also refers to situations where a 
paramilitary organisation continues to exist as an entity with a membership and leadership hierarchy 
but it has terminated its engagement in and capacity for engaging in both organised crime and terrorist 
activities. Currently, there is no evidence to suggest that any paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland 
have undergone complete transformation. Partially transformed paramilitary groups transition from 
hybrids to groups that no longer retain the capacity to commit terrorist violence, but continue to be 
involved in organised crime. As with complete transformation, there is no evidence to suggest that 
paramilitary groups have undergone partial transformation. Lastly, paramilitary groups transform to a 
minor extent. This third situation of transformation captures paramilitary groups whose leadership 
publicly declare ceasefires, commit to the peace process and the decommissioning of weapons and 
withdraw from political campaigns of violence. Nevertheless, they refuse to disband and therefore their 
organisations, leadership structures and sub-groups, recruitment, funding, training, skill sets and 
technical knowledge and revered reputations strategically remain intact.81 As such, these groups 
deliberately retain their capacity to re-engage in terrorist activity should the need arise. While they have 
been assessed as ‘highly unlikely’ to return to terrorism and ‘unable to resurrect the capability 
demonstrated at their peak’,82 the continuing capacity of these groups, albeit much reduced, to engage 
in terrorist violence and the underlying threat remains a concern to law enforcement and a threat to 
national security.83 Additionally, individual members of paramilitary groups continue to engage in 
                                                          
81 Rosie Cowan, “Loyalists Recruit the Next Generation,” The Guardian, 2 April 2001.  
82 Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, An assessment commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the 
structure, role and purpose of paramilitary groups focusing on those which declared ceasefires in order to support and 
facilitate the political process, 19 October 2015, para. 2. 
83 Ibid, para. 18. Interview.  
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violent paramilitary assaults and murders in order to terrorize and ultimately exercise control over local 
communities, both directed by local leadership and conducted without sanction, and continue to 
represent a serious? threat to Northern Ireland’s national security.84 As none of the leadership has 
complete control over the activities of its members85 and they are unwilling to disband and cease to 
exist, then the groups themselves should not escape the attribution of a portion of responsibility or be 
regarded as partially or completely transforming. The majority of paramilitary groups included in the 
Northern Ireland model have undergone minor transformation. Although we refer to these groups as 
transforming in a minor way, this is not to underestimate the significant steps these groups have taken 
to commit to peace during the past twenty years, as is evident by the vastly reduced scale of 
paramilitary-style shootings and bombings at present when compared to the period of the Troubles.86 
This stands in sharp contrast to violent dissident Republican and dissident Loyalist groups included in 
the Northern Ireland model, which have not transformed at all because they reject the 1998 Agreement 
and continue to commit terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland.87 The indicators of complete, partial and 
minor transformation provide important differentiation from previous theoretical frameworks of the 
crime-terror nexus, which suggest only a process of evolution from one type of group (terrorist or 
criminal network) to another.88 
 
The typologies in this new model seek to categorise forms of interactions between organised crime and 
terrorism in Northern Ireland and, where possible, empirically informed references are made to 
particular groups to illustrate how the interactions play out. This model builds upon crime-terror 
theoretical models in existing scholarship, which have acknowledged important organisational, 
structural and activity-related associations between organised crime and terror groups 89 However, these 
models do not necessarily capture the historical evolution and current complexities of linkages in 
                                                          
84 Ibid, para. 2. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Independent Monitoring Commission, First Report 20 April 2004, p.25. 
87 Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, para. 2. 
88 For example, Makarenko and Mesquita, “Categorising,” p.261. 
89  See earlier, referenced in the Introduction. 
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Northern Ireland and therefore it represents a radical departure from them in five significant ways.90 
Firstly, it is not based on the premise that a dichotomy exists between terrorism and organised crime, 
so that these phenomena must always be regarded as being perpetuated by groups driven by different 
political and economic motivations.91 As will be explained below, all of the paramilitary groups in 
Northern Ireland have evolved as both terrorist and criminal groups. Secondly, it does not focus 
exclusively on interactions between paramilitary and organised criminal groups and realistically 
accounts for the activities of networks of individuals within groups.92 In this way it seeks to account for 
current realities in Northern Ireland where small groups of individuals who acquired kudos and skill 
sets as members of a paramilitary organisation during the Troubles engage in organised criminal activity 
for personal profit under the banner of the original paramilitary organisation, taking advantage of the 
fear that their association with the terrorist group can generate. None of the existing models of 
interaction provide for this nuanced level of crime-terror interaction. Thirdly, it introduces new and 
previously unexplored types of interaction to the theoretical debate on the crime-terror nexus, including 
the conflicts that occur both within paramilitary groups and between paramilitary and organised crime 
groups and different gradations of transformation in order to categorise the linkages between crime and 
terrorism in Northern Ireland.93 Transformation is not, therefore, considered solely by reference to a 
groups’ transition from terrorism to organised crime, and vice versa, but by reference to a more nuanced 
indicator of progression which takes into account the failure of the group to disband and its retained 
capacity for resurrecting campaigns of political violence. Fourthly, it notes that the interactions between 
crime and terrorism cannot always be explained in a linear format by reference to a timeline with a start 
and end point from one kind of activity to another. As stated above, this model allows for more complex 
arrangements where terrorist or criminal groups deliberately retain the capacity to return to activities 
                                                          
90 E.g., Clarke and Lee, observed that ‘the continuum proposed by Makarenko cannot sufficiently account for the blurred 
distinction between categories of criminal or terrorist, nor can it realistically represent the dynamic complexity of the PIRA’s 
former day-to-day operations as a terror group, punishment squad, criminal group for fundraising, and alleged collaborator 
with both state and non-state actors,’ Clarke and Lee, “The PIRA,” p. 392. 
91 E.g., see Alex P Schmid, “Revisiting the Relationship between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime”, 
p. 13. 
92 E.g., see Peng Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus”.  
93 Dishman noted different degrees of transformation from one type of group – terrorist or criminal – to another, but not those 




they have previously abandoned. Furthermore, rather than regarding hybridisation as an end-point of 
convergence between crime and terrorism, it is placed centre-point in a fluid model of interaction, 
representing the nexus as undergoing continuing processes of change and transition as various organised 
crime and terrorist networks and capability structures adapt relative to political developments and the 
exploitation of organised crime markets. Lastly, the model is deliberately focussed on Northern Ireland 
in order to provide an informative, localised threat assessment. Such national models of interaction, 
including the one outlined here, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate 
local situations, represent the most appropriate means of capturing and understanding the nexus between 
organised crime and terrorism and factors that contribute to it. This proposition runs against the grain 
of current international good practice recommendations, which advocate the use of existing models 




Part II: Examining the Components of Interaction 
Northern Ireland’s paramilitary organisations have required substantial funds to finance their operations 
and meet related expenses, including, for example, the cost of purchasing weapons and explosives, 
vehicles, communications systems, training, paying operatives, supporting imprisoned volunteers and 
their families and contributing to political campaigns.95 The combined annual budget of the PIRA, the 
UVF and the UDA towards the end of the Troubles in the mid-1990’s is thought to have been between 
£15 million and £18 million.96 The considerable financial demands placed upon the organisations to 
wage their campaigns, particularly during the Troubles, resulted in their engaging directly in organised 
                                                          
94 Although the model is Northern Ireland focused, it does take into account terrorist groups located in Northern Ireland but 
engage in organised crime and have interactions with organised criminal groups transnationally. 
95 Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” p.335-336; HC Committee Northern Ireland Affairs. Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 
Financing of Terrorism, Fourth Report, 2001-02.  
96 On report estimated the combined budget for UDA and the UVF to be £3 million per annum: see Templeton, D. ‘Terror 
Bosses Feel the Pinch’ Sunday Life 21.04.1996, p.12; the PIRA’s annual budget was in the region of £15 million: see Silke, 
“In Defense of the Realm” p.333. In 2002 the PSNI estimated that PIRA raised £5-8 million annually, while RIRA raised £5 
million, UDA raised £1 million and UVF raised £1.5 million: see House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 
The Financing of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, HC 978-1 (2002), para. 33. 
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crime, assimilating criminal activities from organised criminal groups, and forming short-term and 
long-term alliances with them. All of Northern Ireland’s paramilitary groups consequently evolved as 
hybrid organisations. The Good Friday Agreement and later announcements of the cessation of 
campaigns of violence marked processes of transformation of some of them. However, even when 
paramilitary organisations have been on ceasefire, fundraising has continued to finance propaganda and 
political campaigning, as well as provide a precaution in case of the collapse of the peace process.97 In 
addition, not all money raised by paramilitaries , however, finds its way into an organisation’s coffers; 
increasingly individuals have used their status, connections and skills to line their own pockets.98 We 
now examine these interactions in more depth with reference to the constituent elements of the Northern 
Ireland model.  
 
Alliances  
One of the most important and common types of interaction occurring between terrorists and organised 
criminal groups in the Northern Ireland model is alliance, which, until recently, has been little discussed 
in scholarship.99 Yet, they are far from new. A recent study by Hourigan et al. provides a systematic 
overview of the emergence and development of organised crime in the Republic of Ireland and in 
Northern Ireland since the latter part of the 1960s.100 Notably, the authors find that, in many cases, 
organised crime groups and paramilitary groups ‘engaged in mutually beneficial arrangements’.101 
The UK House of Commons Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs officially recognised the 
influence of alliance interactions in Northern Ireland in 2002102 and, in the same year, a threat 
assessment estimated that nearly half of 76 organised criminal gangs had links to paramilitary 
organisations.103 
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Presently, there is ample evidence of alliances established within Northern Ireland’s borders as well as 
transnationally in the EU and beyond.104 The majority of studies on Northern Ireland concentrate upon 
organised crime as a source of terrorist financing.105 However, alliances are more complex than terrorist 
funding and terrorists equally further the aims of organised criminal groups. Based on interviews with 
legal experts, this section provides insight on three different types of alliances within Northern Ireland 
and transnationally—namely, money laundering, contract killing and cross border smuggling 
operations. 
 
(i) Money laundering: Operation Metropolis 
A prominent example of a transnational alliance is illustrated by the Operation Metropolis case study. 
After a five-year investigation in 2013 Italian police uncovered a sophisticated money laundering 
scheme involving the ‘Ndrangheta—the Calabrian Mafia and one of the most wealthy and powerful 
criminal groups in the world—business entrepreneurs in Spain and a former member of the IRA worth 
€450 million.106 According to investigatory evidence arising out of the operation, it is believed that 
Henry Fitzsimons, one of the most active officers in the PIRA during the bombing campaign in the 
1970s and convicted of terrorist offences in 1973, established with members of the ‘Ndrangheta and 
Spanish investors, a joint venture, involving a complex and extensive business structure of shell 
companies and offshore accounts in several countries, to develop luxury properties and tourist resorts 
on undeveloped beaches in the Calabrian region of southern Italy.  
 
The nature of this alliance is complex and not entirely clear but it is likely that it was based on a close 
relationship between the Italian crime syndicate and the PIRA which was forged in the 1990’s when 
the ‘Ndrangheta acted as a go between and ‘guarantor’ for the passage of arms from Lebanon to 
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Belfast.107 In this new interaction the PIRA was laundering money on behalf of the ‘Ndrangheta, which 
was heavily involved in drug trafficking to Europe.108 Fitzsimons was the Director of one of the property 
development companies involved in the money laundering scheme, based in Dublin. Italian 
investigators believe that Fitzsimons reinvested at least €12 million of criminal origin in to the scheme 
and created offshore bank accounts in several countries, with the aim of making money untraceable.109 
According to Nicola Gratteri, an anti-Mafia prosecutor leading the investigation, Fitzsimons was ‘the 
middle-man delegated by the PIRA to recycle the proceeds of terrorist activities and to reinvest the 
financial resources of the movement’.110 Conversely, the ‘Ndrangheta have extensive control over the 
legal economy, particularly the construction industry, and the ability to infiltrate city councils and 
corrupt local politicians, as well as govern and control territory and use intimidation to obtain land.111 
The money laundering scheme enabled the ‘Ndrangheta to reinvest the proceeds of trafficking in drugs 
and weapons and other criminal activities, estimated at tens of billions of Euros annually. The alliance 
with the PIRA signals the tendency of the ‘Ndrangheta to project itself abroad and build strong ties with 
other organised crime and terrorist organisations, as well as a modern and sophisticated way of 
conducting criminal activities behind a screen of legal entities and infiltration of the legitimate 
economy. The PIRA has a long history in money laundering. During the Troubles, it had a finance 
department in charge of procuring and laundering illegally gained funds. The laundering of these funds 
was often carried out through PIRA-owned legitimate businesses, including public houses, Dublin-
based hackney services, video shops, courier services, a security firm, a haulage company and guest-
houses.112 The joint venture with the ‘Ndrangheta therefore represents the ability of terrorist groups in 
Northern Ireland to engage in much more sophisticated money laundering schemes transnationally and 
                                                          
107 Makarenko, “Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus,” p.23-24. 
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penetrate the legal economy.113 Experts from government agencies in Northern Ireland regard this 
alliance as a ‘frightening crossover’ between terrorist and organised crime groups.114 
 
 (ii) Contract killing: subcontracting terrorist groups 
In addition to Northern Ireland’s terrorist groups forming alliances with powerful organised crime 
syndicates to further their aims there is evidence to suggest that organised crime groups form alliances 
with terrorists by subcontracting them to enforce discipline and settle turf wars on their behalf. 115  This 
is illustrated by the contract killing of David Byrne by the CIRA on behalf of the Hutch criminal 
group.116 On 24 September 2015 Gary Hutch—the nephew of the head of the Hutch organised crime 
group based in Ireland, was shot dead on the Costa del Sol.117 Gary Hutch was assassinated by James 
Quinn—a hitman subcontracted by a rival Irish criminal network based in Spain, North Africa and 
Dubai, the Kinahan crime group.118 This group is believed to be one of Europe’s wealthiest and most 
powerful drug cartels with the ‘capability to import drugs from South America, Asia and anywhere else 
in the world’.119 The murder of Gary Hutch began a deadly feud between his large group of criminal 
associates in Dublin and members of the Kinahan crime gang in Spain and its associates in Dublin. 
 
In retaliation for the murder of Gary Hutch, on 5 February 2016, during a boxing tournament weigh-in 
at the Regency Hotel, Dublin, a group of armed men entered the building dressed in police armed 
response unit uniforms and shot dead David Byrne. David Byrne was a ‘soldier’ of the Kinahan 
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organisation, which ‘controls’ boxing in Ireland.120 While Byrne’s murder was a revenge attack by the 
Hutch crime group, it was the CIRA that claimed responsibility for it.121 The gunmen used high-velocity 
Kalashnikov assault rifles, which bear a strong resemblance to the type of weapons used in large 
numbers by the PIRA at the height of the Troubles.122 The choreography of the murder operation equally 
echoes the same type of paramilitary-style killings during the Troubles. According to a CIRA 
spokesperson, David Byrne was also targeted because he had been involved in the killing of Alan 
Ryan—the leader of the RIRA—in Dublin in 2012. Ryan and his associates were involved in various 
types of organised crime and reportedly engaged in a feud with organised criminal groups, including 
the Kinahan organisation. The same spokesperson announced that CIRA units had been authorised to 
carry out further operations. This has led experts from government agencies in Northern Ireland to 
believe that the Hutch criminal group subcontracted terrorists to perform the contract killing.123  
 
(iii) Cross-border smuggling 
While there is a scarce amount of scholarship on illicit weapons and explosives and the links between 
terrorism and organised crime, including in Northern Ireland,124 there is evidence that terrorist and 
organised criminal groups are reciprocally involved in the traffic from overseas and supply of 
weapons.125 In the 1990s the ‘Ndrangheta acted as a go between and ‘guarantor’ on behalf of the PIRA 
for the passage of arms from Lebanon to Belfast.126 During the same period and also in the early 2000s, 
the RIRA purchased large quantities of weapons from the Balkans through a network of state officials 
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and criminal groups.127 It has been suggested that it developed alliances with arms traffickers, led by 
Veljko Borovina, an ally of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, in the Bosnian Serb Republic.128 
With the support of state and military contacts, the arms traffickers sold a range of weapons, leftover 
from the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armed forces and police, to the RIRA.129 Similarly, a General in 
the Croatian armed forces, Ivan Andabak, was questioned by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia over his alleged links with the RIRA, including the establishment of arms 
networks.130 In particular, Andabak is alleged to have supplied a rocket-propelled grenade to the RIRA 
fired at MI6 Headquarters, London, in September 2000, which was manufactured in either Bulgaria or 
Russia and obtained in the former Yugoslavia.131 Andabak is believed to have received explosives 
training from Irish Republicans in the 1990s, while the grenade used to target MI6 Headquarters was 
similar to weapons found by Irish police at a secret RIRA firing range.132 Weapons hauls, including 
rocket-propelled grenades, reportedly destined for the RIRA, have also been discovered in Croatia and 
Slovenia.133 
 
Notwithstanding the dearth of scholarly attention, paramilitary groups illicitly trafficking, accessing and 
utilizing weapons and explosives in Northern Ireland continues to be a significant security threat for the 
police and security forces to the present day.134 Arsovska suggests that there are principally two primary 
markets for illicit arms—those who need weapons for political insurgent purposes, and those who need 
them for criminal ones, including organised crime.135 This dichotomy, however, fades into non-
existence in Northern Ireland given the hybridized status of many of the paramilitary organisations 
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operating there. These weapons are used against the police and security services as well as to commit 
organised crime and maintain control and influence in communities. PSNI data indicate that during 
2016/17 the number of paramilitary style shootings doubled from 14 to 28, 25 of which were carried 
out by Republicans and 3 by Loyalists.136 There were also 29 bombing incidents in the same reporting 
period.137 Moreover, the PSNI seized 45 firearms,138 75.1kg of explosives and 2,635 rounds of 
ammunition,139 the largest quantity of explosives seized per year since 2007/08.140 Between February 
2001 and March 2017 411 individuals were charged with firearms offences and 279 with offences 
relating to explosives.141 Interviews with experts from government agencies in Northern Ireland 
confirms that paramilitary groups obtain a vast array of weapons from different parts of the world, 
including Kalashnikov-type automatic rifles, Heckler and Koch MP5 sub-machine guns, Glock and 
Makarov semi-automatic pistols, and shotguns.142  
 
In an effort to address the lacuna in academic and policy-oriented research on terrorist acquisition of 
firearms in the UK, Holtom et al. examine the methods used by the IRA and other terrorist organisations 
in Northern Ireland.143 Relying heavily on interviews conducted with current and former high-ranking 
UK police officers with experience of investigating the illegal firearms market from an organised crime 
group and counter-terrorism perspective, the authors find that terrorists in the UK do not usually have 
access to the semi-automatic or automatic firearms that have recently been used in terrorist attacks in 
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other parts of the EU.144 However, the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly, with dissident 
Republican groups having retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the Troubles supplied by the 
Qaddafi regime in Libya and continuing to use them in politically motivated attacks. These weapons, 
including different types of military-grade firearms, have circulated in the illegal firearms market for 
decades.145 Although paramilitary weapons have been decommissioned, the members of the UVF, UDA 
and the PIRA continue to have access to weaponry.146 The ‘terrorist-criminal nexus’ also continues to 
influence the availability of illegal firearms in Northern Ireland.147 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that some of these firearms, including military-grade firearms such as Glock 9 mm pistols and Skorpion 
sub-machine guns, might have been smuggled into Northern Ireland more recently by organised crime 
groups, including by using established routes for smuggling drugs.148 These routes include, for example, 
by bus from Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland; by ferry to Dublin and then into Northern Ireland; 
and by ferry from Liverpool in England and Stranraer in Scotland.149 
 
Other cross-border smuggling operations have involved alliances between paramilitary groups and 
organised criminal groups.150 For example, the UVF have been linked to Chinese Triad organised crime 
organisations and the smuggling of drugs, weapons and the illicit traffic of humans.151 The UDA has 
also established alliances with Triads to operate a drugs distribution network across Northern Ireland.152 
The alliance worked with Triads mailing Cannabis packages to a property in Randalstown, which was 
effectively a drugs distribution centre. The drugs were then purchased by Ballymena-based UDA which 
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would send its men to the house to collect the packages, which would be weighed and vacuum packed. 
The drugs were then sold to crime gangs all round Northern Ireland.153  
 
In addition, alliance interactions have been recorded in connection with cigarette and tobacco 
smuggling.154 In 2006 the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs 
received evidence that cigarette smuggling is one of the major activities of organised criminals in 
Northern Ireland and includes the involvement of paramilitary groups.155 In 2012 the Financial Action 
Task Force reported that the RIRA has flooded Ireland with contraband cigarettes and imported 
counterfeit versions of popular brands and that cigarette smuggling was a substantial funding source for 
the organisation. The combined IRA groups reaped an estimated $ 100 million in proceeds from 
cigarette smuggling over a five-year period to 2012.156 In 2014/15 the Northern Ireland Organised 
Crime Task Force seized over 3 million cigarettes, 860 kilograms of hand rolling tobacco and 11 tonnes 
of unprocessed tobacco.157 Furthermore, in 2014 the Home Office Border Force, HMRC and National 
Crime Agency highlighted that, in Northern Ireland, the majority of organised criminal groups 
examined have either a direct or tenuous link with one or more individuals with alleged paramilitary 
connections.158  
 
Interviews with experts from government agencies in Northern Ireland confirm that paramilitary groups 
in Northern Ireland directly engage in and work with transnational organised criminal groups to import 
both counterfeit cigarettes and so-called “illicit whites” – cigarettes made in legitimate factories 
overseas but smuggled into Europe in large shipping containers without paying excise duty.159 These 
groups also have tobacco factories, which are used to manufacture fake cigarettes.160 Paramilitary 
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organisations have forged relationships with organised criminal groups in Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Vietnam and Cambodia and are embarking on cigarette importations from there.161 In December 2011, 
as part of a multi-agency cross-border operation 9.7 million illegal cigarettes were seized in Co. 
Monaghan. These cigarettes were ‘President’ and ‘Hatamenr’ brand and had been imported in a 40ft 
maritime container from Malaysia via Rotterdam. In April 2012, 38 million cigarettes were seized in 
Dublin Port. These cigarettes had been imported from Vietnam via Rotterdam.162 In October 2015, 
almost 10 million cigarettes with a retail value of over €5.25 million were seized in Slane, Co Meath, 
which travelled from Vietnam via Singapore and Rotterdam, arrived into Dublin Port. In October 2017, 
9.6 million cigarettes, with a retail value of €4.5 million, that arrived into Dublin Port on a vessel from 
Rotterdam were seized.163 The European Commission’s Anti-Fraud Office reported that gangs in 
Ireland were working with Eastern European organised criminal groups, particularly from Russia, for 
the purpose of importing counterfeit cigarettes.164 Not inconsequentially, in 2018 Forbes placed the 
RIRA tenth in its list of the world’s richest terrorist organisations, estimating a total annual income of 
$50 million and noting its connections with cigarette and tobacco smuggling operations.165  
 
Assimilation  
Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries have generated funding streams from a variety of appropriated 
activities including extortion, tax fraud, video and audio piracy, drug trafficking, kidnapping and 
smuggling operations involving, in particular, animal grains, cigarettes and fuel.166 Extortion has been 
a reliable source of income for all of the organisations.167 Silke noted widespread extortion practices 
amongst both Loyalist and Republican groups during the Troubles, targeting small and large businesses 
and the building industry.168 By way of example, in 1987 the UDA were exposed seeking £27,000 in 
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protection money by a reporter posing as a businessman in the belief that he was on the verge of winning 
a building contract worth £3.25 million.169 In another case, the UVF demanded an immediate payment 
of £15,000 from a meat-processing factory, failing which it threatened to contaminate its products and 
place them in shops.170 These types of practices have continued beyond the Good Friday Agreement.171 
It is estimated that the average extortion payment for small businesses is between £450 and £750 per 
week though payments of £2,500 a week by building contractors have been reported172 and large 
building sites may expect to pay between £20,000 and £30,000 or more.173 Targets are usually located 
within geographical areas controlled by particular paramilitary organisations and are offered assurances 
that, upon payment, they will not be approached by another group, though these arrangements are 
occasionally infringed. A committee of MPs were advised in 2006 that a businessman paid a six-figure 
sum to the PIRA and a five-figure sum to the UVF,174 demonstrating the lucrative nature of this type of 
criminal activity to different groups on opposite sides of the political divide in Northern Ireland.  
 
Robbery and theft have also been commonplace fund-raising activities. Robberies targeting 
organisations connected to the state and multinational corporations are particularly appealing due to 
their potential high yield and low political cost. The early twentieth century saw IRA volunteers 
undertaking robberies of bookmakers, post offices, retail outlets and in-transit services.175 The 
development of the INLA in the 1970’s was assisted by robberies of gun shops and post offices176 and 
the UVF was responsible for committing bank robberies and stealing weapons and arms from the police 
during the Troubles.177 These types of activities continued to be committed regularly by the PIRA until 
its instruction to its volunteers to desist from engaging in criminal activity in 2005. Not long before 
then it was claimed to have been responsible for three robberies, including the hijacking a number of 
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cigarette lorries with a market value of £2 million178 and also for the robbery of a central branch of 
Northern Bank which yielded £26.5 million and more than £1 million in US dollars and euros.179  
 
It is reported that Loyalist paramilitaries currently represent by far the most formidable bloc of 
organized crime activity in Northern Ireland today. 180 Until the early 1990’s, when there was a shift 
towards drug trafficking and dealing, the traditional primary sources of funding for the Loyalists were 
drinking clubs, extortion, robbery, smuggling and counterfeiting. By the mid-1990s, it was estimated 
that approximately 60% of Northern Ireland’s drug trade had fallen under the control of Loyalist 
paramilitaries.181 It is likely that Loyalist groups continue to control the drug trade to this extent 
today.182 From 2000 onwards, Organised Crime Task Force reports continually indicated that the 
Loyalist groups remain very active in relation to drug dealing, extortion, smuggling and 
counterfeiting.183 The final IMC report in 2011 singled out the Loyalist groups for particular concern 
and warned that: ‘Some members and former members of all groups remain heavily involved in a 
wide range of serious crime, exploiting the contacts and expertise they acquired during the Troubles 
and thereby presenting a challenge to law enforcement which is significantly more serious than it 
would otherwise have been.’184 The House of Commons Select Committee on Northern Ireland 
Affairs also reported that there is a tendency for Republicans to predominate in cases of smuggling, 
armed robbery and fraud and for Loyalists to specialise in drug crimes, intellectual property theft and 
extortion, using legitimate businesses, notably pubs, clubs and taxi firms as cover for their illegal 
operations.185  
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We consider the continued engagement in criminal activity of those groups that have announced the 
end of their campaigns of violence in more detail later.186 Dissident Republican groups, such as the 
RIRA, CIRA and ONH, continue to be directly involved in organised crime to the present day, including 
armed robbery, smuggling of fuel, cigarettes and tobacco and extortion.187 ONH and CIRA were 
reported to be responsible for armed robberies committed in 2008 and 2009.188 The Independent 
Monitoring Commission’s report in May 2009 and November 2010 noted the involvement of both the 
CIRA and the RIRA in a range of serious criminal activities.189 A former member of the PIRA, Aiden 
Grew, who served 15 years in prison in the 1980s for a landmine attack, was jailed in 2011 for offences 
relating to the smuggling of contraband cigarettes.190 More recently, Hourigan et al note provisional 
republicans located in south Armagh engaging in the illegal treatment and re-sale of diesel and that 
between 200 to 300 operators in the trade have become millionaires as a result.191 Thomas Murphy, a 
member of the PIRA, was reported in 2016 to be earning more than £10 million a year from four diesel 
laundering plants worth £23 million.192  
 
With regard to some interactions the distinctions between alliances and assimilation can be blurred. 
This is particularly evident in the context of gun-running operations. In 2000 self-professed PIRA 
member Conor Claxton and three of his associates were tried and convicted in the US on charges of 
purchasing 122 firearms and 600 rounds of ammunition and smuggling them to the Republic of 
Ireland.193 Claxton claimed that he had been sent by ‘higher ups’ within the PIRA to purchase the 
weapons, which were intended to be stockpiled in the Republic of Ireland.194 In 2001 the U.K. secured 
the extradition of three Irish individuals arrested in Slovakia on suspicion of gunrunning for the RIRA, 
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who were later convicted of conspiracy to import weapons,. MI5 officers had posed as members of the 
Iraqi intelligence service, purporting to be a state friendly to their cause and willing to supply weapons 
and explosives.195The leadership of the RIRA were purported to be seeking state sponsorship for their 
activities and aiming to establish an alliance with a foreign government in support of their cause, in the 
same way that the PIRA had sought support from the Gaddafi regime during the Troubles.196  
 
More recently, RIRA members have been involved in the illicit traffic of weapons and explosives both 
directly and by attempting to establish alliances with organised criminal groups. For example, in 2010 
Paul McCaugherty, a deputy commander of the RIRA, was convicted of attempting to import an arsenal 
of weapons and explosives into Northern Ireland, including 100kg of explosives, detonators and cords, 
20 AK-47 assault rifles, 20 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, ten sniper rifles and 20 pistols with 
silencers.197 Mr Justice Hart, presiding over the non-jury trial, formed the opinion that McCaugherty: 
‘Was one of a group of terrorists determined to buy arms and explosives to carry out attacks on members 
of the security forces in Northern Ireland.’ The RIRA used a restaurant on the Algarve in Portugal as a 
global hub for weapons shipments to Ireland as well as a means to fund terrorist operations. It had a 
purpose-built trailer, which it used to transport the weapons from Portugal to a safe house, purchased 
by McCaugherty, in southern France. The RIRA also engaged in lucrative cigarette smuggling activities 
in Continental Europe in order to fund the cost of weapons purchases.198 In 2011, Portugal prosecuted 
two individuals from Northern Ireland with links to the RIRA for possession of weapons and 
ammunition. According to police in Portugal, the individuals were connected to a criminal organisation 
engaged in international arms trafficking.199 It is believed that the men were attempting to send the 
firearms to the RIRA in Northern Ireland.  
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Closely linked to McCaugherty’s conviction, in 2011 Michael Campbell was convicted in Lithuania of 
supporting a terrorist group, illegal possession of weapons and attempted smuggling. Campbell was 
caught in an MI5 weapons sting operation in 2008, with an agent posing as a Lithuanian arms dealer, 
for attempting to purchase weapons from Lithuania and smuggle them to Ireland for the RIRA.200 
Campbell was directly involved in the traffic of firearms but believed that he was establishing an 
alliance with a criminal group.  
 
Conflict  
It is in the interest of organised criminal groups to minimise hostilities with paramilitary groups.201 
However, the engagement in organised criminality has seen paramilitary groups become embroiled in 
violent feuds with organized criminal gangs across both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, 
and most notably in Dublin.202 This is illustrated most clearly by the violent conflict between dissident 
Republican paramilitary groups and the Kinahan criminal network. This conflict includes the contract 
killing of David Byrne, who was lieutenant of the Kinahan criminal network, by the CIRA on behalf of 
the Hutch criminal group.203 It is reported that the Hutch criminal group has a long-term alliance with 
the PIRA and that the figurehead of the Hutch grouping has received protection from PIRA members.204 
In addition, the NIRA allegedly murdered Michael Keogh, a member of the Kinahan group, and offered 
to supply explosives to the Hutch gang.205  
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Mickey Barr—a member of the NIRA—was assassinated by the Kinahan criminal network for the 
supply of weapons to the Hutch criminal group.206 In response, the NIRA held a high-level summit and 
approved a plan to revenge attack the Kinahan gang for the murder of one of their members.207 It is 
reported that the NIRA may subcontract organised criminal groups from across continental Europe to 
murder members of the Kinahan gang headquartered in Spain.208  
 
Similarly, the murder of the RIRA leader Alan Ryan by a criminal gang was also a result of his 
involvement in one of these feuds.209 Ryan and his associates were reportedly involved in various types 
of organised crime and used the front of a security company to run a vast protection racket targeting 
legitimate businesses, at the same time as imposing ‘taxes’ on various criminal groups.210 For instance, 
Ryan ‘licenced’ the narcotic trade across Dublin; those groups that paid taxes were permit to stay in 
business, whereas those that did not had members threatened and even murdered. Ryan organised the 
murder of drug dealers on behalf of other drug dealers competing for dominance. Ultimately, he himself 
was murdered after he threatened a criminal group to make payment for drugs shipments entering 
Ireland.  
 
Conflict also occurs within paramilitary organisations. The leadership of the UVF faces strong 
opposition from brigades in Ballymena and Coleraine and in particular East Belfast, where operatives 
are heavily involved in criminality, including drug dealing and extortion.211 In addition, conflicts 
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between paramilitary groups influence the dynamics of the nexus. For instance, it is reported that the 
Kinahan group has an alliance with the INLA and that the INLA murdered members of the Hutch 
group.212 In retaliation, the NIRA dispatched a murder squad to assassinate members of the INLA.213 
The past fifteen years have been marred by very serious conflicts between Loyalist groups, with control 
of organized crime activity frequently lying at the heart of most of the feuds.214 Prior to the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement, a violent split in the UVF in 1996, which led to the emergence of a new and 
aggressive group, the LVF, was primarily connected to the drug-dealing activities of the latter group.215 
Feuding between the two groups, thought to be the result of criminal competition and the LVF’s 
involvement in the drug trade, escalated between May 2004 and August 2005, leading to the deaths of 
5 LVF members, 17 attempted murders, and 18 incidents involving the use of explosives of petrol 
bombs.216 Hourigan et al argue that Loyalists groups will continue to control the illicit drug trade in 
Northern Ireland and maintain their active involvement in organised crime, which is likely to result in 
persistent conflict between the various factions, leading to a fragmented bloc of groups whose ambition 
and focus is more concerned with control of power over local areas and of organised criminal activity 
within them than with creating any cohesive network and coherent political representation in the post 
peace-process era.217  
 
Hybrids and Transformation  
It is a striking feature of the nexus between crime and terror in Northern Ireland that all of the main 
Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groups developed into hybrid organisations. The groups that 
declared the cessation of their campaigns in order to support and facilitate the political peace process 
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and the dissident republican groups that continue to pursue terrorist tactics have all, at some stage, 
engaged in criminal activity while at the same time conducting their terrorist campaigns. 
This hybridisation has been the consequence of their turning to crime to finance terrorism.218 In so 
doing, as has been noted, they both assimilated the activities of organised crime syndicates and formed 
alliances with them, demonstrating an ability to suitably adapt to and profit from a diverse range of 
criminal opportunities as they arose.  
 
Those organisations that existed during the Troubles that we consider in this analysis, namely the UVF, 
UDA, PIRA and INLA, continue as hybrid organisations but have nevertheless undergone minor 
transformations following their declaration of ceasefires and the decommissioning of their weapons. 
The significance to the peace process of their public announcements of the end of their campaigns of 
violence cannot be underestimated. Nor can the impact of decommissioning on their ability to engage 
in terrorism be dismissed lightly. In this regard, according to British intelligence services, they have all 
‘undergone significant change.’219 However, interviews with experts from government agencies 
confirms that while these groups continue to remain in existence they retain a capacity to return to 
violence and represent a continuing threat to security. It is this retained potential for resurrecting their 
campaigns of violence that distinguishes them as having undergone only minor transformations.  
 
In making this point it should be acknowledged that the full extent of the transformations of these groups 
is sometimes difficult to accurately determine as the structural composition of some of them allows for 
autonomous criminal activity limited to networks of individuals.220 These individuals typically engage 
in the same types of criminal activities and rely on the same criminal connections developed by the 
organisation until its ceasefire, as well as its reputation for violence. While the criminal activities may 
or may not be sanctioned by the leadership of the paramilitary organisation and may be the actions of a 
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few individuals rather than of a homogenous group, it is their association with the organisation that 
enables them to profit from the activities and therefore, for this analysis, these criminal activities are 
construed as related to the organisation. This approach provides that until an organisation disbands and 
ceases to have any membership, training, recruitment or any capacity or reputation for violence and 
crime upon which individuals or autonomous cells can rely for profiteering, it and its leadership should 
assume responsibility for their acts.  
 
The hybrid nature of the UVF can be traced from the time of its emergence until the decommissioning 
of its weapons in 2009, by which stage the IMC reported that it was ‘on its way to going out of business 
as a paramilitary organisation.’221 Its violent campaign resulted in more than 500 deaths until the Belfast 
Agreement222 and it continued to engage in sectarian-related shootings, assaults and pipe-bomb attacks 
until its renouncement of violence in 2007.223 At the same time, it was raising funds from a range of 
criminal activities, including robbery, extortion and smuggling and the IMC considered it to remain 
‘heavily engaged in major crime’224 until its 2007 statement. Its purported intent to transform from a 
military to a civilian organisation and the decommissioning of its arms was called into question with its 
assassination in May 2010 of a former associate, Bobby Moffett.225 Currently, as an entity, it is reported 
as being no longer engaged in a campaign of violence and its central leadership has been attempting to 
move it away from criminality and towards a complete transformation to a non-violent, non-criminal 
organisation.226 However, brigades in north and east Belfast continue to be heavily involved in extortion 
and the illicit drug economy and are using networks that the UVF developed during the Troubles to 
profit from these activities.227 M15 reported in 2015 that a large ‘number of members, including some 
senior figures, are extensively involved in organised crime.’228 Moreover, according to legal experts, 
the organisation as a whole boasts a membership in the thousands, still has large reserves of financial 
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assets and retains access to weaponry and explosives.229 This evidence points towards a minor 
transformation from an organisation actively committing acts of terrorism to one outwardly committed 
to peace but engaging in organised crime and retaining its capacity to quickly re-engage in terrorism. 
 
The situation with regard to the UDA is broadly similar. It quickly developed into a hybrid organisation, 
engaging in both terrorism and organised crime, following its formation in 1971. Scholars including 
Moran, Silke,230 Taylor231 and Bruce232 have reported extensively on its engagement in criminality 
throughout the Troubles, during which time it killed 408 individuals and was responsible for more 
civilian deaths than the PIRA.233 Its hybrid status appears to have continued at least until its 
decommissioning of weapons in 2010. According to the IMC, it continued to murder people and 
undertake paramilitary assaults and shootings beyond the Belfast Agreement234 and it was still recruiting 
and acquiring weapons until 2009.235 Furthermore, successive IMC reports from 2004 to 2010 warned 
of its continued involvement in the drug trade and various other criminal activities including loan 
sharking, extortion and cigarette supplying.236 
 
Following decommissioning the structural makeup of the organisation has remained intact, though it is 
becoming increasingly fragmented with different brigades operating autonomously.237 Some leadership 
figures are committed to transforming the organisation to one committed to peace and refraining from 
criminality. However, the result of limited centralised control is that it has diminished the impact of 
leader’s reform agenda over the activities of its members who, according to the M15 assessment in 
2015, continue to engage in paramilitary-style assaults and organised crime. The fragmented 
organisational structure of the UDA makes it difficult to make strong assertions about its transformative 
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nature, but the continued involvement of some of its members in both violence and crime once again 
suggests a minor transformation.  
 
Amongst the Republican groups, the PIRA, which was responsible for 1771 murders during the 
Troubles,238 remained active as a hybrid organisation until the announcement by its leadership in 2005 
of the end of its campaign of violence.239 The previous year, it had been responsible for eight shootings, 
had undertaken the Northern Bank robbery, and was described by the IMC as a ‘well-funded 
organisation, deriving substantial income from smuggling and other criminal activities.’240  
 
Since 2005 the PIRA’s leadership has maintained a commitment to pursuing a strategy of political 
reform to achieve its ideological aims and the same leadership has instructed volunteers to give up all 
forms of criminal activity.241 This suggests that the PIRA has undergone a complete transformation to 
an organisation that has disengaged from both terrorist and criminal activity. Certainly there appears to 
be a significant deterioration of the terrorist intent and capabilities of the organisation and, according to 
British intelligence services, it is ‘not involved in targeting or conducting terrorist attacks against the 
state or its representatives.’242 Nevertheless, it refuses to disband and retains its command structures. 
Moreover, some former members of have continued to be involved in criminal activity, including large-
scale smuggling, hijacking and extortion243since the PIRA ceasefire. Furthermore, it retains access to 
weapons and is assessed by local enforcement organisations as presenting a threat of returning to 
terrorism if its political goals are not achieved.244 The result is an organisation that has undergone a 
minor transformation since 2005.  
                                                          
238 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” p.4. 
239 Dishman, “Terrorism,” p. 48-49. 
240 Independent Monitoring Commission, 1st Report, 20 April 2004, p.13.  
241 The statement of 28 July 2005, stated ‘volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.’ See Independent 
Monitoring Commission, 7th Report, 19 October 2005, p.9. 
242 “Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland,” p.4. 





The INLA was also a hybrid organisation during the Troubles and until its announcement of the end 
campaign of violence in 2009. Responsible for 126 murders during the Troubles, it was considered by 
the IMC to have remained ‘a significant terrorist group’245 beyond the Belfast Agreement and was 
assessed in 2008 as continuing to present a threat, with capacity for extreme violence246 while also 
perpetrating serious crimes ‘including drug dealing, extortion, robbery and offences against the revenue 
such as fuel laundering and smuggling.’247  
 
Since decommissioning its weapons in 2010 the leadership of the INLA have continued to commit to 
the peace process. However, there is minimal centralised control of the organisation and small factions 
of the organisation operate independently of each other across NI, with some members engaging in 
criminality including illicit drugs and extortion. It is also alleged to still be recruiting and to retain access 
to weapons, some of which it supplies to republican dissident groups. These links that some of its 
members still have with political violence and organised crime suggest that the INLA continues to 
remain a hybrid organisation.  
 
As noted earlier, Dissident Republican groups, such as the RIRA, CIRA and ONH, also continue to 
exist as hybrid entities. British intelligence services assess them as presenting ‘the most serious current 
terrorist threat in Northern Ireland.’248 Responsible for between 15 and 40 terrorist attacks annually 
from 2000 to 2015249 they remain intent on dismantling the peace process and community recognition 
of normal policing by targeting the PSNI in particular. At the same time, they are engaging in organised 
crime to finance their campaigns. IMC reports have noted all of them as being heavily engaged in a 
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range of criminal activities including drug dealing, robberies, smuggling, kidnapping and extortion.250 
These groups are unlikely to transform any further as they are not committed to the political peace 
process. Similarly Loyalist paramilitary groups are currently unlikely to undergo more than a minor 
transformation in the absence of any robust political platform capable of representing the interests of 
its members.  
 
Part III: The Northern Ireland Model and the Crime-Terror Nexus 
Looking at the crime-terror nexus through the prism of the new Northern Ireland model gives rise to a 
number of important findings. Firstly, all of the Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organisations 
either have been or continue to be hybrid entities, engaging simultaneously in crime and terror. Those 
groups that operated during the Troubles and that declared ceasefires have undergone a minor 
transformation and continue to engage in organised crime while retaining a worrying capacity to return 
to terrorism. Dissident Republican organisations, meanwhile, operate as hybrids and continue to commit 
acts of terrorism. 
 
The hybridisation of these organisations is a consequence of their need for funds to meet their annual 
operating expenses and to prepare for sustained campaigns of violence. This necessitated the 
assimilation of and direct engagement in a diverse range of criminal activities associated with organised 
crime groups as well as the development of lucrative alliances with organised crime syndicates, as 
outlined in Part II. In engaging in both forms of interaction, paramilitary organisations have 
demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and exploit, as well as develop, new opportunities for 
profiting from both domestic and transnational criminality. Notably, many assimilated activities such 
as extortion, armed robbery, kidnapping and the taxation of drug dealers occur within geographical 
areas over which the paramilitary groups assume control. Alliances also occur within Northern Ireland. 
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However, as evidenced from money laundering and smuggling operations outlined in Part II, this type 
of interaction tends to be noticeably more transnational in nature, requiring increasing levels of 
sophistication.251 During the Troubles, for example, the PIRA typically laundered money through 
domestic outlets such as video shops, taxi and security firms. Now, paramilitary organisations are 
profiting from more complex transnational money laundering schemes which employ offshore accounts 
to filter illicit proceeds of crime into the legal economy.  
 
Secondly, the hybridisation and minor transformation of the paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland 
has implications not just for the domestic but also for the global terrorism and organised crime 
landscape. Through their engagement in organised crime, evidenced by activities such as weapons, 
drugs and cigarette smuggling, these paramilitary organisations, and the criminal networks that they 
have established, extend beyond Northern Ireland and are penetrating illicit economies in different 
regions of the world, including, for example, Europe and South East Asia. Given the evidence of 
transnational paramilitary-criminal activities referred to in Part II it is reasonable to surmise that some 
of the 100 organised crime groups known to be linked to the paramilitary organisations in Northern 
Ireland that the PCTF are monitoring are also operating transnationally. The result is that the 
engagement of paramilitary organisations in organised crime is both encouraging and facilitating 
organised crime in other countries. Similar concerns can be raised in the context of international 
terrorism, given that the hybridisation of Northern Ireland’s paramilitary organisations has resulted both 
directly and indirectly in facilitating international terrorist organisations. The organisations in Northern 
Ireland have been complicit in transferring their knowledge base and skill sets to terrorist organisations 
elsewhere. We reference in Part’s I and II the PIRA’s alliance with FARC and the passing on of 
bombing techniques between terrorist organisations. FARC is also reported to have replicated the 
PIRA’s structural composition. 252 
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Thirdly, organised crime networks continue to profit from their interactions with Northern Ireland’s 
paramilitary organisations. Using a variety of networks of their own they source illicit commodities for 
the organisations, arrange for their transportation, take payment and launder the proceeds. These 
syndicates have no political affiliations and, consequently, are able to enter into alliance transactions 
with paramilitary organisations from both sides of the political divide. What emerges, therefore, from 
this analysis is that the interactions between crime and terror in Northern Ireland comprises a complex 
web of networks between organised crime syndicates, each with their own networks of contributors to 
the sourcing, transportation and laundering processes, and various individuals, groups and factions 
associated with assorted paramilitary groups, all of which either engage in or retain a capacity for 
engaging in terrorism.253 Conversely, there is evidence that organised crime groups conflict with 
paramilitary organisations in some situations, particularly when there is rivalry for control over illicit 
trade or a breakdown of an existing alliance. This, in turn, impacts in how both types of organisations 
establish and maintain their alliance interactions.   
 
Fourthly, all of the paramilitary organisations analysed in this article, both those that have 
decommissioned and those that have not, continue to be involved with criminality and are likely to 
continue to do so until they disband. This seems to be the case irrespective of their organisational 
structure. Some groups that have announced the end of their campaigns, such as the PIRA and UVF, 
maintain a centralised command structure and arguably greater oversight of the actions of their 
members, suggesting an improved ability to prevent criminality.  The PIRA has long been regarded as 
one of the most highly organised terrorist groups the world has seen, with a hierarchically organised 
command structure.254 However, it also employs a system of isolated, independent cells or active service 
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units, which has allowed for autonomous acts of criminality committed by members and former 
members since the announcement of the end of its campaign. The UVF also has a clear hierarchical 
command and control structure. Yet in spite of this and its senior ranks calling on members to desist 
from criminal activity, its lower ranks continue to be involved in widespread criminality.255 Other 
groups, such as the INLA and UDA, can be more accurately described as comprising a loose network 
of autonomous factions, mostly operating in their own interests while relying on their association with 
the organisation. While the leadership of all of these organisations have publicly declared that their 
members should disengage from criminality, their members continue to profit from crime, ensuring that 
the links between these organisations and criminality remain intact. Until these organisations disband, 
which the leadership will not yet countenance, their members will continue to engage in organised 
crime.  
 
It should be noted also that the engagement of Northern Ireland’s paramilitary groups in organised crime 
has important implications for scholarship on the crime-terror nexus. The models of crime-terror 
interaction developed to date fail to accurately map the complex and dynamic interactions between 
crime and terror in Northern Ireland. The ability, for example, of paramilitary organisations to 
decommission and commit to ceasefires but retain a capacity for terrorism does not fall neatly within 
these models. Moreover, they do not adequately account for the conflicts that occur between terrorist 
and organised crime groups. Nor do they capture situations where individuals and loose networks 
associated with paramilitary organisations oscillate between active terrorism, periods of inactivity and 
organised crime while the groups to which they are associated may or may not have decommissioned 
or sanctioned their acts. Existing nexus models also assume that terrorist organisations are capable of 
undergoing complete transformations to organised crime groups and vice versa, whereas evidence in 
Northern Ireland, where no complete transformations have yet taken place, suggests that there is a need 
for grading to reflect different scales of transformation at different times. The impact of existing 
scholarly models cannot be underestimated, particularly as they are influencing strategic decision-




making aimed at identifying and countering linkages between crime and terror at the international level. 
However, their inapplicability to the situation in Northern Ireland highlights an important gap in 
existing scholarship and suggests that national models of crime-terror interaction are better able to 
capture the nuances of these links and their repercussions in any particular jurisdiction than those 
designed for universal application. 
 
In addition, the organisational structure and hybridised composition of the paramilitary organisations 
impacts on law enforcement responses. The autonomous arrangements of a number of the organisations 
and the ability of different cells within them to engage in criminality of their choice renders if difficult, 
and perhaps even unnecessary, to assess the split between personal profits and the desire to fund terrorist 
activity or establish any clear distinction between terrorism and organised crime.256 As a result of the 
autonomous nature of the criminality of several of the existing paramilitary organisations, the police 
response has been to concentrate on individuals as opposed to groups.257 In terms of developing 
effective responses to the criminality of the paramilitary groups it is essential that the phenomena of 
organised crime and terrorism should be viewed in Northern Ireland through the same lens and treated 
one and the same. Both scholarship and officialdom have been slow to recognise this.  
 
It has taken time for the United Kingdom government to respond to the challenges presented by 
paramilitary criminal activity in Northern Ireland. An Organised Crime Task Force was established in 
2000 but it was not until 15 years later that a framework was agreed by the United Kingdom and Irish 
governments and the Northern Ireland Executive, which resolves to bring about the end 
paramilitarianism and its associated criminality.258 As a result of this agreement a Paramilitary Crime 
Task Force was established in 2017, which is comprised of officers from the PSNI, NCA, HMRC and 
has the specific remit of tacking all forms of criminality linked to paramilitarianism. To date, it has 
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seized an estimated £58,000 worth of drugs and illicit tobacco products preventing the loss of 
£1,237,462 in revenue, as well as retained £50,000 worth of cash.259 
 
These successes are tainted, however, by uncertainty about the Task Force’s future. It is now two and 
half years into its five-year programme of funding until 2022 but there has been no clear commitment 
by the UK government that it will provide further funding beyond then or, if it will, what the budget 
will be, making long-term planning problematic.260 This requires urgent commitment and funding from 
the three Executive bodies responsible for the framework committed to ending paramilitary activity and 





This article has utilized a wide range of empirical evidence to develop a new Terrorism-Organised 
Crime Interaction Model to identify and accurately understand the complex and dynamic interactions 
between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland. This is the first national theoretical model 
of its kind?, designed for application specifically at the local level,. In doing so, it fills an important gap 
in existing scholarship. Indeed, there has been a lack of scholarship examining the nexus between 
terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland, while existing crime-terror theoretical models intent 
on universal application do not adequately capture the complex realities of the nexus in Northern 
Ireland. Looking through the lens of the Northern Ireland model reveals an array of domestic and 
transnational activity assimilation and alliances, as well as other new forms of interactions including 
conflicts and different gradations of transformation.  
 





The Northern Ireland model illustrates that one of the most important legacies of the Troubles and the 
post peace process era is the hybridisation and minor transformation of paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland. The groups that formed during the Troubles used their influence to gain positions of strength 
in local communities. Having secured these positions, they engaged in large scale organised crime, 
evidenced by assimilation and alliance interactions, involving a diverse range of activities. As hybrid 
organisations they continued to engage in these activities beyond the 1998 Good Friday Agreement 
when a reduction in security as part of a UK government policy designed to augment peace and 
reconciliation arguably allowed for increased levels of paramilitary criminal activity.261 The 
hybridisation of Northern Ireland’s paramilitary groups, therefore, spans a remarkable 50-year period 
from the start of the Troubles in 1969 to the present day, which highlights the extent and longevity of 
the convergence of crime and terrorism in the country, unparalleled anywhere else in Europe.  
 
In 2014 the UN Security Council, pursuant to resolution 2195, called upon states to better understand 
and address the nexus between organised crime and terrorism, a point reiterated recently in October 
2018 by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)  It is notable that bodies 
such as UNICRI and the Global Counterterrorism Forum, responding to this resolution, are currently 
proposing to adopt existing crime-terror conceptual models which are intent on universal application to 
assist states in developing national policy, law enforcement and intelligence responses.262 However, this 
article has shown that these models are not always effective when applied at the national level. In the 
light of these findings, it is likely that these models may equally be unable to capture and explain the 
evolution, synergies and interactions between terrorism and organised crime in other jurisdictions and 
across different operational environments. In response to CTED and resolution 2195, this article 
advocates consideration of the adoption of national theoretical models as a standardised methodological 
approach for identifying and understanding the nexus, rather than one-size-fits-all models devoid of 
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local context, recognising that they will have transnational value and will be significant for mapping 
and understanding the nexus in other affected jurisdictions. 
 
The UK and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland Executive have recognised—and tackled head-
on for the first time in the past twenty years since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement—the 
terrorism-organised crime nexus in Northern Ireland with the establishment of the Paramilitary Crime 
Task Force. This has been a vital development as it allows for a holistic view of the nexus drawing 
together collective expertise from the PSNI, National Crime Agency, Organised Crime Task Force and 
HM Customs and Revenue. At the same time the Paramilitary Crime Task Force and law enforcement 
agencies are finding it difficult to understand the terrorism-organised crime nexus as the Northern 
Ireland Executive, dormant since January 2017, has not yet developed a comprehensive policy on it. 
The lack of an authoritative executive body has also restricted urgently-required legislative reform 
necessary to enhance the ability of the Paramilitary Crime Task Force to tackle money laundering and 
conspiracy-related offences. At the same time, the future of the Paramilitary Crime Task Force is 
uncertain due to funding limitations. This also comes at a period of marked political uncertainty as a 
result of Brexit and its implications for border control between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland and policing the transnational criminal activity of paramilitary and organised criminal groups 
across Europe and beyond. While the Interaction model responds to recent calls by the UN to encourage 
increased understanding of the nexus in order to develop context-specific responses, it also underlines 
the considerable challenges that lie ahead in countering the interactions between terrorism and 
organised crime in Northern Ireland. It is evident that continued and urgent investment is now required 
to enhance research, intelligence sharing and cooperation between non-governmental organisations and 
national, regional and international law enforcement agencies concerned with further understanding and 
tackling these legacies of the Troubles. 
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